The DAB Safety Team: April 3, 2013
Media Contact: Don Leichtling (619) 296-9928 or Ace Hoffman (760) 720-7261
Titled: Concurrent Main Steam Line Break and Steam Generator Tube Ruptures in Unit 2 at 70% Power -
Which explains in detail why any restart at San Onofre puts Southern California at risk of a nuclear accident.
A
complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed
below), which are posted on the web at this link: DAB Safety Team
Documents.
The DAB Safety Team has transmitted the following
to the Offices of the Chairman of the NRC, California Attorney General
and Senator Barbara Boxer’s Committee on Environment and Public Works
(EPW).
A great enforcement example: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
Station is a nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. On March 5, 2002,
maintenance workers discovered that corrosion had eaten a football-sized
hole into the reactor vessel head of the Davis-Besse plant. Corrosion
had been clogging the plant’s filters for months, requiring repeated
filter replacement, but the cause was not investigated until after a
worker leaned against a control rod drive mechanism, and it toppled
over. Although the corrosion did not lead to an accident, this was
considered to be a serious nuclear safety incident. Some observers have
criticized the NRC’s Commission work as an example of regulatory capture
[See Note 1] and the NRC has been accused of doing an inadequate job by
the Union of Concerned Scientists. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
kept Davis-Besse shut down until March 2004, so that FirstEnergy was
able to perform all the necessary maintenance for safe operations. The
NRC imposed its largest fine ever—more than $5 million—against
FirstEnergy for the actions that led to the corrosion. The company paid
an additional $28 million in fines under a settlement with the U.S.
Department of Justice. The NRC closely monitored FENOC’s response and
concluded in September 2009 that FENOC met the conditions of the 2004
order. From 2004 through 2009 the NRC reviewed 20 independent
assessments conducted at the plant and verified the independent
assessors’ credentials. The agency also conducted its own inspections
and reviewed FENOC’s reactor vessel inspections conducted in early 2005.
NRC inspectors paid particular attention to the order’s focus on safety
culture and safety conscious work environment to ensure there were no
new signs of weakness. The NRC task force concluded that the corrosion,
occurred for several reasons:
· NRC, Davis-Besse and the
nuclear industry failed to adequately review, assess, and follow up on
relevant operating experience at other nuclear power plants;
· Davis-Besse failed to ensure that plant safety issues received appropriate attention; and
· NRC failed to integrate available information in assessing Davis-Besse’s safety performance.
Questionable
enforcement at San Onofre by Region IV and the NRC: The papers shown
below have been obtained from Public Domain written by Dr. Joram
Hopenfeld and a former SONGS Employee based on his investigation of the
steam generator issues, review of the plant data and discussions with
several Key SONGS Insiders. These papers confirm that Southern
California Edison wants to restart unsafe Unit 2 nuclear reactor at 70%
power under false pretenses, just for profits, and as an unapproved
risky experiment by subverting the NRC and Federal regulatory process.
The true Root Cause (See Note 2) of the unprecedented tube-to-tube wear
in Unit 3 has NOT been officially established, as required by NRC
Confirmatory Letter Action 1 for restarting the defectively designed and
degraded Unit 2. NRC has not even completed their review of Unit 2
Return to Service Reports, nor have they finished Special Unit 2 Tube
Inspections, nor have they (publicly?) reviewed SCE’s Response to NRC’s
Requests for Additional Information (RAIs). Now, SCE wants the NRC to
approve a new shady License Amendment, undermining public safety and do
it without the involvement of Public Safety Experts/Attorneys and
Citizens/Ratepayers. After the review of the Mitsubishi Root Cause
Evaluation and the Draft SCE License Amendment, it is crystal clear that
the NRC needs to follow the example of their own enforcement at David
Besse together with the lessons learned from Fukushima, when it comes to
approving this new Shady License Amendment for restarting San Onofre
Unit 2’s defectively designed and degraded replacement steam
generators. In light of the unanticipated/unprecedented tube leakage at
SONGS 3, the health and safety, along with the economic
concerns/objections of 8.4 million Southern Californians’ MUST OVERRIDE
and PREVENT the restarting of Unit 2 at 70% or ANY power level. In a
Democratic Society, truth must prevail over profit motivations,
misleading propaganda of electricity service disruption and/or projected
probabilistic temporary inconveniences to the public based on phony
data, because America cannot afford a trillion dollar nuclear
eco-disaster!
Safety must override SCE profits and prevent Unit 2 from restarting.
Notes:
1:
Regulatory capture occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in
the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns
of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged
with regulating. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as
it can act as an encouragement for firms to produce negative
externalities. The agencies are called "captured agencies".
2.
Human performance errors resulting from the negative safety culture of
production (profits) goals overriding public safety obligations.
The complete five (5) part presentation (see the eight (8) titles listed below
Part 1, First Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=1GcDuO0NvUdBBRVqCinM3Gr9bhmsJDCIbOg65rwdtjBY
Part 1, Second Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=1v_UcRLUlwmhtVDbftGcROPkF-cujiGa_-qjUJ7i2WIM
Part 1, Third Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=1yCOQ_diw8Qix1qG3j7MC6F2VfcqMoFOidxjJdIBpba0
Part 1, Fourth Part https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1
Part 2 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=1wkyTGWUy0pIXjBXc91JWr6_ACB3d-AIQbuVVZtDRZvI
Part 3 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=16VmGtq9oYGS2-bpR4nBt9d-YB21E2xrjFpIJoxFJ4s4
Part 4 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=0BweZ3c0aFXcFMC1BNlpMeDQyM2M
Part 5 https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BweZ3c0aFXcFZGpvRlo4aXJCT2s/edit?pli=1&docId=0BweZ3c0aFXcFX2gxRDFCRW9CVzg
###
The
DAB Safety Team: Don, Ace and a BATTERY of safety-conscious San Onofre
insiders plus industry experts from around the world who wish to remain
anonymous. These volunteers assist the DAB Safety Team by sharing
knowledge, opinions and insight but are not responsible for the contents
of the DAB Safety Team's reports. We continue to work together as a
Safety Team to prepare additional: DAB Safety Team Documents, which
explain in detail why a SONGS restart is unsafe at any power level
without a Full/Thorough/Transparent NRC 50.90 License Amendment and
Evidentiary Public Hearings. For more information from The DAB Safety
Team, please visit the link above.
Our Mission: To prevent a Trillion Dollar Eco-Disaster like Fukushima, from happening in the USA.
Copyright
April 3, 2013 by The DAB Safety Team. All rights reserved. This
material may not be published, broadcast or redistributed without
crediting the DAB Safety Team. The contents cannot be altered without
the Written Permission of the DAB Safety Team Leader and/or the DAB
Safety Team’s Attorney
-----------------------------------------
Ace Hoffman, computer programmer,
author, The Code Killers:
An Expose of the Nuclear Industry
Free download: acehoffman.org
Blog: acehoffman.blogspot.com
YouTube: youtube.com/user/AceHoffman
Phone: (760) 720-7261
Address: PO Box 1936, Carlsbad, CA 92018
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2 comments:
Hello Ramaswami - haven't seen you on enenews lately. Hope all is well. Congratulations on being cited in the book "Nuclear Roulette."
Take care,
Dee
Thanks for the comment and the info Dee. We can be sure unfortunately of a series of explosions at nuclear facilities in the coming found hydrological years. The Kedardome damage hit by the World's dams and the profound tragedy in the Uttarkhand valleys is a grim reminder of the coming nuclear catastrophes round the world.
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